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FROM THE FORUM

The National Security Presidency in
Constitutional Context:
REFLECTIONS ON TERRORISM AND THE PRESIDENCY
FROM THE LAST TEN YEARS
BY JAMES E. BAKER

n this time of terrorist threat, there is no more important institution to study
than the national security presidency. That is because the president is singularly situated to command the instruments to counter terrorbm. He is also singular-

I

ly situated to ensure that such instruments are used effectively, lawfully, and in a
manner consistent with constitutional values. I believe I have a duty, based on
where I have been, to help others observe and understand the institution of the
presidency. I do so became I want the national security presidency to ~ucceed in
providing for our physical security and in upholding our constitutional way of life;
or, as the president's constitutional oath states succinctly, "to preserve, protect.
and defend the Constitution." Those who teach, interpret and study the presidency have an important duty to play in this process by testing the institution to
ensure that these functions are successfully performed.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND PRACTICE

I once had occasion in a public setting while standing be~idc the national security adviser to describe my bos~. When I launched into a description of the
Constitution and Articles I. II. and HI, there wa~ a gasp in the room as it became
apparent that I was not talking about the man at my side. An emerging smile on
Mr. Berger's face put the audience at ease. Mr. Berger understood that our oaths
of service are to the Constitution, and not to the presidem, or any other person.
The presidency is a creation of the Constitution. Ib responsibilities arc defined
by the Constitution. Therefore, it must be evaluated with the Constitution in
mind. So let me start with four observations regarding the Constitution in presidential practice.
First, the Constitution is opportunity and not result. The United States
Constitution is history's greatest code of governmental honor. Part of its greatness
derives from its success in providing for collective physical security at the same
time that it provides a framework for lives of individual choice and opportunity.
From a military perspective, the Comtitution establishes the principle of civilian
control of the military and provides for separate and shared authorities over the
resort to war and the means of war. The immediate and intended advantages of
12

I

SPRING/SUMMER 2003

such a structure for a democracy are
obvious. Less apparent are the indirect
benefit~ resulting from a military
devoted to its profession rather than to
its politic~. and from a military that is
derivative of the people, and not
beholden to a particular branch of government. person, or party.
At the same time, the Constitution
acknowledges that individuals and
governments do not always act with
honor. "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. " 1 Madison
wrote, and "if angels were to govern
men. neither external nor internal controb on government would be necessary." I marvel at the drafters' ability to
foresee so many of the ways that men
and women within each branch might
undermine the intent and spirit of the
Constitution, driven by the real. and
perceived. necessities of the moment.
Therefore, at almost every metaphorical crossroads there is a structural "control" in the Constitution to remind us
of our democratic and legal roots. And
when government has strayed from
the constitutional path. we have also
learned that the Comtitution has a
heavy keel. which is capable of righting
the ship of state. But it is the helmsman
and the crew and not the ship that
seizes the wind of constitutional opportunity.
That leads me to my second observation. The Comtitution is not on
autopilot. Like everyone else. I learned
about the checks and balances in high
schooL college. and law school.
Invariably. these controls were presented with operational certitude. The
practice of constitutional law at the
NSC taught me otherwise. I was surprised at how fragile constitutional
government can be and how depend-

em it is on the integrity and values of
those who wield its power. Rule of law
is a daily commitment to the process of
constitutional government, and to
one's individual role and duty in that
process. This is particularly true in a
secret war against terrorists where the
ordinary mechanisms of validation and
appraisal exercised by the press, the
public, the Congress, and the judiciary,
may be muted, deferential, or even
absent.
In national security, there is always
an argument. and often a good argument. for truncating process. classifying decisions, and asserting broad
authority so as not to unduly delimit
responses to unknown and perilous
contexts. As illustration. the National
Security Act envisions three congressional reporting mechanisms for covert
action: 1) prior notification of the full
committees; 2) prior notification of
eight leaders in "extraordinary circumstances;" and 3) post-facto notification,
in undefined circumstances that, presumably, are more than "extraordinary."2 In the long run. there are
enduring consequences if we make the
"extraordinary circumstance" the
norm. And yet, we live in extraordinary times. Part of the president's
duty then. and that of his lawyers. is
to make decisions on a factual and
constitutional continuum and to identify the short term and long term substantive and procedural consequences
of decision.
Third. the Constitution functions as
much through informal application as
it does through formal checks and balances. Constitutional government is a
daily grind of contacts and disclosure.
none of which would happen without
the constant effort of a few persons

James E. Baker is a judge on the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces. He
formerly served as special
assistant to the president and
legal adviser to the National
Security Council ( 1997-2000) and
as deputy legal adviser to the
NSC ( 1994-1997). The views
expressed herein are those of the
author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the U.S.
Government or any organization
within the U.S. Government.
Judge Baker spoke at the Miller
Center on June II, 2003. Baker
opened his remarks with a tribute
to Colonel Nelson Drew, a
colleague on the NSC staff and a
one-time scholar at the Miller
Center. He described Nelson as a
good man of honor, dedication,
intellect, and values, who made
the ultimate sacrifice for his
country while on a peace mission
to Bosnia.
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with the vision and commitment to
meaningfully
substance of
much of the
consultation,

apply the process and
law. This means that
process of notification.
and validation between

political branches goes unseen. But the
daily give and take between the political branches is oil between the gears of
constitutional government. Those who
focus on form alone will see only a
Kosovo War Power~ report of careful
design and limited content and not the
48 informal congressional briefs that
preceded the report. Those who focus
on function alone will note only
whether the president notified the congressional leadership before a terrorist
strike. but not whether it was done
with a receptive ear.
All of these observations lead to a
fourth fundamental observation. The
concept of law depends on individual
conduct and vision. It depends on a
president and a process of presidential
decision that incorporate the meaningful application of law. For even where
the legal standard is clear. someone
must still identify and trigger the standard. As A. Whitney Griswold
observed, while we are a nation of
laws. it is men and women who write,
interpret, and apply the law, which
means "we have in fact a government
of laws and a government of men." '
The Constitution may have given us a
framework for civilian control over the
military. but it was George Washington
five years earlier surrendering his commission to the Congress. that put this
principle into practice.
Today. and for years to come. no
person will have more influence on
whether and how we turn constitutional principle into practice than the
president.
14
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Presidwt George W Bush, Vice Presidmt Riclwrd Che11ey, Do11ald Rumsfeld,
a11d Colldoleezza Rice. at the Pe11tago11, September 12. 200 I.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY
PRESIDENCY
During the past ten years the presidency
moved from the episodic crisis and
response to terrorism. to a constant state
of readiness and perpetual command
over the policy instruments to counter
terrorism. While there may be more
than one reasonable view a~ to when
this process started. without question it
was underway after the first World
Trade Center attack in I993. After the
August 1998 embassy bombings. counter-terrorism command became the
daily. centraL omnipresent feature of the
national ~ecurity presidency. September
II in turn ensured that counter terrorism would become a permanent fixture
of the institution of the presidency. in
the same way that atomic weapons permanently transformed the presidency
after World War II.
To be sure. terrorism was among
the government's highest priorities
throughout the 1990s and well before.
I certainly felt that way in the early

1990s when I had the counterterrorism
account in the State Department's
Legal Office. I was not alone in this
outlook. There was always a professional cadre of officials addressing the
terrorist threat, and they could always
and immediately call on the attention
of the principal national security officials. Serious efforts at weapons of
mass destruction defense. for example,
began in the mid-I990s after the Tokyo
subway attack. Moreover, the full
range of instrument~ for responding to
terrorism was
table.

alway~

on the policy

But in retrospect. I think the influence of terrorism on the presidency
itself was at first evolutionary. After
August 1998, the effect was more revolutionary as it was clear the United
States was facing an organized worldwide terrorism network capable of
attacking hardened targets and with an
avowed intent to kill as many
Americans as possible and to do so with
weapons of mass destruction.
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Constitutional government is a

In 1990, terrorism was one of a
number of important national security
issues. In 1998, terrorism became the
business of the day, every day, not one
of a number of revolving crises. This

decision, I mean express approvaL such
as a memorandum box checked or
direct verbal assent. I also mean less
formal approval such as the verbal
assent at the close of a brief, or

was true for the president. It was true
for the national security adviser. And, it

acknowledgment of an information
memorandum read before action is

would happen without the

was also true for their national security
lawyer. Every day I came to work and,
indeed, every time the phone rang at
home-the attorney general on a

taken.
In the past ten years, the critical

constant effort of a few

Sunday afternoon, the national security adviser at 3:00 a.m. on almost any
night-! anticipated that the issue was
terrorbm and that decision-makers
were addressing an emerging target or
potential threat. This required an
understanding of how the president
makes decisions so that I could provide
legal guidance in an effective and timely manner.
National security does not wait for
lawyers. In such a context, if a lawyer's
advice is not immediate, or if a lawyer
is not able to guide to yes, or il necessary say no, then he will not be consulted.

PRESIDENTIAL PROCESS
AND DECISION

presidential decisions on terrorism
were framed and decided by the president
using
the
NSC
process.
Specifically, this process centered on an
NSC-Ied
working
group,
the
Com1terterrorism Security Group
(CSG), reporting directly to the
Principals Committee, or a small group
of principals and the president.
The threat from terrorism is real. It
is imminent. It is lasting. It is potentially devastating. And, it is local. Whether
by design or default, the pre~ident b
singularly situated to respond. The
president alone has the decisional
capacity and authority to do so in a
timely and effective manner. The president is also best situated to appraise
the efficacy and lawfulness of U.S.
actions.
Let me demonstrate what I mean.
The president is the most effective
engine in government. He commands
response. If he holds a meeting, people
come. Presidential decision-making can
be extraordinarily fast. I have participated in the most difficult question of
law and fact that was identified,
briefed, and decided by the president,

The president has traditionally used
two structural resources to manage
national security: cabinet government
and the NSC proce~~. Tensions can arise
between the two, with Iran-Contra as a
recent example. But I do not view
these structures as inherently in conflict. Rather, when exercised with
appropriate oversight, they are complimentary mechanisms of decision, and
only in rare cases where the president
is directly engaged, implementation.

with the concurrence of the attorney
generaL in less than five minutes.
Speaking with reference to leadership
targets in Iraq, General Franks

By president, I mean the actual
holder of that office, not the NSC staff
who advise and assist him. And by

acknowledged that presidential decisions can be made on "an amazing time
line[.]"' Based on my seven years at the

daily grind of contacts and
disclosure, none of which

persons with the vision and
commitment to meaningfully
apply the process and
substance of law. This means
that much of the process of
notification, consultation, and
validation between political
branches goes unseen. But the
daily give and take between
the political branches is oil
between the gears of
constitutional government.
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NSC, I am persuaded that if you give
me a problem and a timeline, I can provide you with a process of decision, and
if appropriate consultation, that will
contextually and effectively include the
application of policy and law by officials who are constitutionally accountable for their advice and their
decisions.
The president can also gather and
fuse multiple sources of information
and perspective faster than any other
official in government, which is essential when pop-up targets emerge for
moments and strike decisions must be
taken in difficult geopolitical contexts
with imperfect information. Presidential fusion is also important where a
target presents difficult factuaL or intelligence judgments like an Al-Shifa. In
these latter cases, additional perspective may distinguish the sound decision
from the merely rapid decision.
Presidential process, in my view,
also generally contributes to better
decision. First, as a bureaucratic observation, staff work tends to improve in
rigor as it runs up the chain of command, particularly to the president.
Second, presidential process can serve
as a fail-safe where such process channels options into regular and specialthe
ized
review.
Significantly,
erroneous bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade during the
Kosovo campaign followed the identification and generation of a target outside the normal target process. While
the presumptive target designated in
briefs was indeed military in nature, as
is now well-known, human error
placed the target at the wrong coordinates, even as the correct target was
reviewed and approved by the chain of
command.
16
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Presidmt Bush with Do1wld Rwnsfeld.

The president is also singularly situated to address is~ues of interagency
policy dispute. There is nothing wrong
with such disputes. They help to identify issues and best options. They are
problematic if they linger or if they drive
principals' decisions down to lowest
common consensus rather than leave
hard questions up to the president.
In addition to resolving policy dbputes, the president alone may have
the will and the power to force decisions to the surface. Master bureaucrats
know how to stop policy initiatives in
their tracks through grudging staff
work or tl~e assertion of departmental
authority. The CIA can invoke "sources
and methods" to prevent the disclosure
of information another agency might
wish to disclose to win allied support or
defend a decision. The Defense
Department can argue that a proposed
mission is outside its national security
mandate. And, the State Department
can and will almost always plead lack
of funding.

Where persuasion fails, the president alone has the authority to compeL
through exercise of his constitutional
authority over state secrets; through
determination as commander in chief
that the proposed assistance is a
national security mission; and, by
directing the draw-down of government stocks and surpluses. These illustrations demonstrate the essential role
that law plays in the national security
presidency.
As significantly, the president can
call upon "the bully pulpit" to effect
counter-terrorism policy. "National
security" reaches a vein of American
patriotism, commitment. and sacrifice
that is not tapped through other
means; and no one can reach this vein
like the president. As Alexander
Hamilton recognized in Federalist 8:
"Safety from external danger is the
most powerful director of national conduct."' When it comes to homeland
security, the potential importance of
this function is magnified.

First, the socialization of danger
after 9/ II has made ordinary citizens
participants in the national security
process in a way not previously experienced. At the ~ame time, as I think
Secretary Ridge ha~ recognized, the
public may become hardened to perpetual alarm and in the future may
hesitate to take essential actions unless
asked by the president to do ~o. The
president alone, for example, may be
able to convince populations outside
New York and Washington that the
threat from terrorism is as real and
imminent for them as it is for those
cities.
Second, homeland security has
placed state and local authorities on the
front lines of national security. Today,
vertical process is as important as
national process. This is new national
security ground, where the president's
power to persuade is essential if traditional principles of federalism are to
remain intact. Alternatively, in the
absence of preemptive legi~lation, the
exercise of presidential constitutional
authority may be necessary to enforce
quarantines or respond to interstate
events.
Finally, while the government has
so far prescribed only a limited role for
the military in homeland security,
there is no question in my mind that
the military alone has the capacity and
expertise to deal with some of the catastrophic contingencies in play. The
Northern Command is the military's
surge potential. Such a use of the military may transform America's perception of the military. The president alone
can order such action, and it would
seem, that he alone could persuade the
public that such action was both necessary and temporary.

As these homeland security examples illustrate, the president is singularly situated to direct the war on
terrorbm because he alone wields the
constitutional and statutory authority
to do so. The president's core counterterrorism tools are military force, and
intelligence, economic, and foreign
affairs instruments.
Military force. Clearly, the president should decide that which he is
constitutionally required to decidetruism. This includes the resort to
force. Successive administrations have
cited, in war powers reports, the president's authority as commander in
chief, his control over foreign affairs,
and his role as chief executive, as
authority tor a president's use of force.
In the context of terrorism and homeland security, the president's duty "to
take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" is also implicated.'·
Whether the president must abo
approve the methods and means of
force will depend on the context. This
might be the ca~e when a targeting
decision itself constitutes the constitutional authorization to resort to force;
for example, the 1986 aerial raid on
Tripoli, or the 1998 combined strikes
on a terrorist command meeting in
Afghanistan and the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. In addition, the
pre~ident alone may have the authority to change a concept of operations or
timeline he has previously approved,
or to approve certain types of targets or
the use of certain weapons. It is also
clear that the president is specially situated to make the legal and policy judgments associated with the law of armed
conflict. He and the Secretary of
Defense are the only civiliam within
the military chain of command, and he

alone has the constitutional authority
and duty to command U.S. forces and
to uphold the law.
Intelligence. Intelligence is the
oxygen of counter-terrorism. As is well
understood now, but has always been
the case, the national intelligence
capacity is diffuse and the responsibility
over its priorities and functions at times
is uncertain. Certainly, the Department
of Defense and the CIA comprise the
central components of national intelligence. But the National Security Act
accepts a bifurcation in responsibility
over the day-to-day intelligence functions between the secretary of defense
and the director of central intelligence,
the exact split of which is not always
certain. Moreover while the majority of
intelligence assets, measured in terms
of production, personnel and cost,
reside within the Department of
Defense, the majority of domestic intelligence capabilities are regulated by the
Department
of
Justice
and / or
Department of Homeland Security. At
the same time, Executive order 12333
recognized 14 components to the
"intelligence community."' In fact.
there are more, if one considers that the
Center~ for Disease ControL USDA, or
the local sheriff also may be critical conduits of actionable information.
Understanding this breadth, the
coordination challenge is clear. Even if
agencies consisted entirely of angels,
they might differ on the best means to
accomplish common goals. In reality,
the only official with the necessary
legal and policy authority to centrally
control the entirety of America's
national intelligence function is the
president. Thus, the question is not
whether the secretary of defense, the
DCL or the secretary of homeland
SPRING / SUMMER 2003
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... all presidents deeply and
sincerely feel a duty to
protect American lives. I
found this pressure palpable
when observing the
president I worked for and I
think it is evident in the
language and actions of
President Bush and
presidents before him. But it
must be exercised in
coordination with his duty to
uphold the Constitution.

security should direct and control a
central intelligence function, but how
these officials might best advise and
assist the president in fulfilling his constitutional responsibilities over intelligence, found in Article II, recognized in
executive practice, identified in those
few Supreme Court decisions that
address intelligence, such as Tottend
(1875), Curtiss-Wright,'' and Egan, '" and
legislated in the National Security Act.
Administrations that do not fully grasp
the president's central intelligence role
will increase the risk of another 9 Ill.
With respect to covert action, the
president'~ role is defined and certain.
Resort to covert action requires the
president to determine that an activity
"i~ necessary to support identifiable
foreign policy objectives of the United
States and is important to the national
security of the United States ."'' Thus,
covert action is an instrument of presidential policy.

Economic
and
Diplomatic
Instruments. Similarly, the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA), which provides authority
to freeze and seize terrorists' assets and
prevent transactions with terrorist
states, requires a presidential declaration of national emergency finding an
"unusual and extraordinary threat to
the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States." 11 Likewise, many of the mo~t significant
exceptions to the Foreign Assistance
Act, permitting the provision of counter terrorism and other assistance
notwithstanding stattnory limitations
that might otherwise apply to allies
cooperating in the war on terrorism,
are contingent on particularized presidential determinations of national
security need. "

18
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Presidential Reporting. The president is also responsible for a large volume of annual and episodic reports to
Congress. The breadth of the president's reporting requirements is
incredible, and probably not apparent
to all but those few persons who
review (or sign) every report. There are
too many reports for sure, and this b
an area where presidential process
should be streamlined. But I should
note as well that some reports might
have useful and unanticipated function
in the terrorism context. Let me give
you one example.
The War Powers
Resolution
requires the president to submit a
report to the Congress within 48 hours
after introducing United States armed
forces into hostilities or into situations
where hostilities are imminent; into
the territory, airspace, or waters of a
foreign nation while equipped for combat; or in numbers that substantially
enlarge U.S. armed forces equipped for
combat already located in a foreign
nation.'• As a matter of longstanding
practice, the executive branch does not
indicate under what section a report is
filed. This reflects the difficulty in
drawing legal lines between "imminent
hostilities," "ongoing hostilities," and
scenarios where forces are "equipped
for combat," particularly where it is
hoped that the latter will deter the former." As importantly, reports involving
"hostilities" are inextricably linked to
the 60-day clock, which is, in theory,
triggered by "hostilities." '" Among
other things, the resolution requires
the president to report on the circumstances necessitating deployment, the
legal authority for the deployment and
the estimated scope and duration of the
hostilities or involvement. "

------~~~----------------------------------~----~--~----~ ·
Successive administrations have
submitted "war powers" reports.
always preserving as a matter of record
that the report is submitted "consistent" with the War Powers Resolution.
but not "pursuant" to it, which in legal
theory would imply acceptance of its
constitutionality and binding nature. In
practice, grudging and pedantic debates
over whether a soldier was "equipped
for combat" have given way to a general executive and bureaucratic acceptance that war powers reports are part
of the national security process, and
ultimately a useful method of creating
a paper trail of congressional consultation for long term deployments. As a
result, the executive on my watch put
as much time into preparing the
reports as they used to put into thinking of reasons why a report need not be
submitted.
The majority of war power reports
are inconsequential and ministerial.
Nonetheless, the reports sometimes
serve a useftil purpose if executed in
good faith. The reporting elements
force the executive branch to consider
at the outset of a deployment questions
involving scope and duration, at a time
when policymakers are almost exclusively focused on the predicate reasons
for deployment. Further, because the
report is sent under presidential signature, and not directly from one department or another, the report can serve
as a useful test of purpose. Do the
national security agencies agree on the
characterization of the mission, its
goals, and its anticipated length? Does
the president agree with the bureaucracy's characterization in the draft
report? In addition, the report makes
the president accountable for the exercise of presidential authority. For these

same reasons the reports are often
diluted to the lowest common denominator of agreement. Nonetheless, in
the process, the executive may find fissures within the bureaucracy that
while not ultimately reflected in a
generic report, serve as the touchstone
for internal consideration.
In reality, the Congress if not the
public at large, will be informed of
most operations in advance, or immediately after, through the process of
consultation or by the press. However,
in a war on terrorism, where the president has emphasized the necessity of
engaging in secret and covert operations, war power reporting may take
on added importance. The reports may
serve as a trip wire to ensure notification to the Congress of deployments
that may not warrant individual consultation in the context of an overall
campaign.
Appraisal. Harold Lasswell and
Myres McDougaL in their study of government process identitied seven functional components to decision:
intelligence, promotion, prescription,
invocation, application, termination,
and appraisal. So far, I have identified
for you reasons why the national security president is singularly situated to
perform the first four of these functions. I would like to conclude by discussing why the president is also
singularly situated to perform the
appraisal function in a war on terrorism. I am not expressing a value judgment. My observation is not intended
to dissuade other branche<> of government, the public, the press. and the
academy, from engaging in the appraisal function. Quite the contrary, my goal
is to help those who study the presidency to determine how they might

most appropriately and effectively perform this function, aware of the factuaL prudential, and legal influences that
may apply. Nonetheless, the reality is
that the president is specially situated
to perform the appraisal function. By
appraisaL I mean the considered application of constitutional structure, executive process, legal substance, and the
review of decisions both before and
after they occur.
AppraisaL I believe, is the least
understood and defined aspect of the
national security presidency. And for a
presidency conditioned to crisis and
command, it is the most difficult decisional
function
to
implement.
However, it may be the most important
function in a war against terrorism.
Appraisal tells you whether your policy
is working. The benefit of such review
is obvious where the margin for error is
small, resources are finite, the threat is
WMD, and the enemy is global. So too,
events are intertwined; each decision
will bear both intended and unintended consequences.
An effective process of appraisaL in
my view, should also be the sine qua
non for the broad and flexible grant of
authority necessary to detect and
respond to terrorism. However, ordinary mechanisms of appraisal are often
muted in the national security, and
particularly the terrorism, context.
First, counter-terrorism efforts are
often and necessarily secret; therefore
the press and the public are not as able
to perform their ordinary function of
testing and validating executive action.
Second, the Congress and the Judiciary
apply principles of deference to national security generally, and no more so
than when lives are at stake. Thus.
ordinary constitutional processes of
SPRING / SUMMER 2003
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democratic and constitutional legitimization may be les~ effective. Finally,
in no area of policy will the pressure to
"get it right" be strong as within the
executive branch; in no area should it
be as strong.
I am confident that all presidents
deeply and sincerely feel a duty to protect American lives. I found this pressure palpable when observing the

presidential decisions should provide
for speedy and flexible response, they
should also be crafted with suflicient
specificity so that it is clear to the president what he is deciding and the
implications of doing so, and so it is
clear to those implementing the decision what they are authorized to do.
Operators will almost always push for
more flexibility. Presidents should be

president I worked for and I think it is
evident in the language and actions of

careful they do not go too far and surrender authority over the actual substance of a decision. For you cannot
have effective appraisaL and accountability, if there is no discernible standard
against which to mea~ure result.
Moreover, presidential decision is an

President Bush and presidents before
him. But it must be exercised in coordination with his duty to uphold the
Constitution. This means that the president must ensure that he has a process
that meaningfully appraises as well as
decides. In my view, this requires roleplaying; that is, the designation of officials who have as their responsibility
ensuring that ongoing operations are
conducted consistent with Jaw and in a
manner consistent with presidential
direction. Do presidential directives
work in practice? Has presidential
process delayed decision, or put U.S.
persons at risk? If so, is such process
well founded? Do policy or legal directives, which provide for headquarters
exception. nonetheless chill agency
risk-taking as a matter of bureaucratic
culture? Where the President has provided limited or nuanced authorization
have circumstances changed?
In the case of a campaign conducted with embedded journalists reporting
24/7, the answers to these questions
may be self-evident without need for
inquiry. But where clandestine operations are involved, or serial conflicts
outside the public eye. e.g., the Iraq No
Fly Zones ( 1991-2003) or Somalia,
such questions are more relevant.
I believe this also means that while
20
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face, the president must daily exercise
effective command over all the instruments to counter terrorism. As importantly, the president and his immediate
staff must recognize that the president
alone is singularly situated to perform
this function. Third. the president must
appraise the manner in which these
instruments are used to ensure that
they are employed effectively and lawfully.
Finally, with counter-terrorism the
constitutional buck will indeed always
stop on the president's desk. +

essential source of democratic and constitutional legitimacy for actions taken
in secret with limited external input or
review.

*
*
*
Much about presidential decisionmaking properly derives from the per~onality and style of each president.
Presidential process will also be shaped
by the president's views, and those of
his senior staff. regarding the role of
the president as commander in chief. It
will also reflect the level of confidence
a president has in his subordinates and,
perhaps, his confidence in his own substantive and moral command over
security. However, I believe after
August 1998, that there are aspects of
the national security presidency that
must and will remain constant.
First, the presidency must continue
to be defined and evaluated in a constitutional context. The Constitution provides a framework for opportunity that
embraces national security and a
process of lawful and democratic decision. Second, in light of the imminent
and potentially catastrophic threat we
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